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Abstract 
Background 
The molecular diagnostic patent landscape mostly comprises patents claiming rights over 
genes and other research tools. Many such patents have been granted, and many more 
await examination.  
Objective 
To explore the issue of whether such patents are leading to adverse socio-economic 
consequences by stifling innovation and access.  
Method 
This article begins with an examination of some key patents in the molecular diagnostic 
landscape and key aspects of their legality. Evidence of detrimental impact is then 
examined, using empirical studies conducted by the author in Australia and other 
researchers in other jurisdictions. Finally expert opinion is provided on the current impact 
and future challenges of patenting for the molecular diagnostic industry.  
Conclusion 
While enforcement of relevant patents against public-sector organizations appears to be 
somewhat less frequently encountered than might be expected, private organizations are 
likely to be exposed to far more such actions. It is argued that these organizations should 
consider more cooperative licensing strategies, outside the more traditional exclusive 
rights model. 
 
Keywords: BRCA1, clearing house, gene patents, intron sequence analysis, molecular 
diagnostics, molecular diagnostic industry, ordre public or morality, patent pooling.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The number of molecular diagnostic tests for genetic diseases continues to increase. It 
was recently reported that, in a five-and-a-half-month period between late 2007 and early 
2008, the rate of increase in the number of diseases for which genetic tests are available 
was 8.4%, bringing the total number of available tests to 1,236 [1]. In addition, 
developments in testing for variation in single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) are 
opening up whole new fields like pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics [2].  
 
Concomitant with this steady increase in number and types of tests, the molecular 
diagnostic patent landscape is inexorably becoming more and more cluttered. Navigating 
this patent landscape is a highly complex endeavour. If it were necessary for every 
clinical molecular diagnostic laboratory to work its way through the clutter of patents for 
every genetic test it performed, the delivery of testing services would, in all likelihood, be 
significantly delayed and costs would escalate. Similar concerns apply for research 
carried out in the molecular diagnostic space. The task of searching for relevant patents 
and interpreting claims is complex enough of itself. If negotiations then have to be 
entered into for use of products and processes within the scope of the claims, costs and 
timeframes would be further extended. If patent holders refuse to license or only license 
on restrictive terms then clinics may cease offering certain testing services and 
researchers may abandon research projects (the extent to which these eventualities have 
actually arisen in practice will be examined later in this article). 
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How is it, then, that the number of molecular diagnostic tests continues to increase and 
research continues to be undertaken? Is it really the case that patents are leading to 
adverse socio-economic consequences by stifling innovation and access in this area? This 
paper explores these issues in five parts. First a brief overview of the molecular 
diagnostic patent landscape is undertaken. Key aspects of the legality of such patents are 
then considered. Particular attention will be paid to the recent decision of the European 
Patent Office (EPO) in a case considering the legality of one of the patents relating to the 
BRCA1 genetic test for susceptibility to hereditary breast and ovarian cancer [3]. The 
refusal by the US Supreme Court to hear a case relating to the patentability of a method 
for measuring blood homocysteine levels, will also be considered, because that case has 
reopened debate as to the legality of patents relating to products of nature in that 
jurisdiction [4]. Evidence of detrimental impact is then examined. Finally expert opinion 
is provided on the current impact and future challenges of patenting on the molecular 
diagnostic industry and strategies for navigating around some of these challenges. 
 
2. Patents in the molecular diagnostic landscape 
 
2.1 Types of patents in the molecular diagnostic landscape 
The most prevalent types of patents in the molecular diagnostic landscape fall under the 
generic rubric of ‘gene patents’. A 2005 study identified 4,270 human gene patents and 
concluded that patent claims existed for nearly 20 per cent of all human genes, with some 
genes featuring in up to 20 separate patents [5]. Yet what does and does not constitute a 
gene patent is far from clear [6]. Gene patent claims are highly variable [7], ranging 
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from: whole gene sequences to partial sequences; isolated corollaries of naturally 
occurring sequences to recombinant sequences, that lack the non-coding regions (introns) 
of the naturally occurring sequences; entire protein-coding sequences to hybridisable 
probes, regulatory regions and fragments of unknown function; wild-type sequences to 
disease-related mutations and other polymorphisms that do not necessarily affect function 
[6]. Claims can be specific to the identified nucleotide sequence, or broad enough to 
cover some or all of the possible variants that code for a particular polypeptide sequence, 
or, even more broadly, all of the nucleotide variants that code for all of the functional 
variants of a particular polypeptide sequence. Vectors, cell lines and host cells are also 
likely to be claimed. Products and processes can be claimed. Claims can be ‘comprising’ 
(including any subject matter that uses the disclosed sequence, even where those uses 
have not been disclosed) or ‘consisting of’ (restricted to the sequence as claimed) [8], [9]. 
This last aspect of gene patenting is one of the most controversial. Indeed, debate about 
the legality of gene patents crystallized in the early 1990s when multiple applications 
were filed by the US National Institutes of Health for ‘comprising’ patent claims relating 
to gene fragments of unknown function (otherwise known as expressed sequence tags or 
ESTs) [10]. 
 
In addition to this amalgam of subject matter that might come within the ubiquitous ‘gene 
patent’ badge, research tool patents also loom large in the molecular diagnostic 
landscape. Research tools are the technological developments that enable particular lines 
of research to be pursued, that, of themselves, may have no direct therapeutic or 
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diagnostic application [7], [11]. Gene sequence information itself can be a research tool, 
since it, like other research tools, can guide future research [7]. 
 
In this article, the term ‘gene and related patents’ is used to describe all relevant patents 
in the molecular diagnostic landscape. Mapping this landscape in its entirety is an 
arduous process, requiring the development of search strategies for identifying relevant 
patents and templates for classifying claims. Research groups in the US and Europe have 
been developing such strategies and templates for some years [5], [12], [13], [14], [15], 
but give the complexity of the landscape, progress is slow and the techniques developed 
by different groups do not necessarily produce consistent results. While is would be 
impossible to survey the entirety of this landscape in an article of this scope, some of key 
patents are briefly summarised in this section to provide some idea of the general 
contours of the landscape. As most of these patents were first filed in the US, US patent 
details are provided. 
 
2.2 BRCA1 
Perhaps the most notorious gene patents in terms of alleged impact on molecular 
diagnostics are those associated with BRCA testing [16], [17]. Myriad Genetics, Inc was 
formed in the early 1990s as a spin off from the University of Utah and focused much of 
its early research effort on discovery of the genes associated with hereditary breast and 
ovarian cancers, at the same time as other researchers were turning their attention to this 
task [14]. In 1996 the University filed patents claiming rights to the BRCA1 gene and 
various mutations and gave Myriad exclusive licences. One prominent example is 
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US5753441, entitled ‘170-linked breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility gene’, filed on 
5 January 1996 and granted on 19 May 1998 [18]. Through this and other patents granted 
in the US and other jurisdictions, Myriad acquired broad rights over a range of mutant 
BRCA1 gene sequences and their use in diagnosis and prognosis of breast, ovarian and 
other cancers, therapies and drugs. The patents include claims to a whole range of 
methods for identifying, screening and detecting mutant sequences, nucleic acid probes 
hybridizable to the gene sequences, cloning vectors, expression systems and recombinant 
host cells. Other patents relate to BRCA2, a second gene connected to hereditary breast 
and ovarian cancer. 
 
2.3 Hungtington’s disease 
The task of characterising the gene associated with the development of Huntington’s 
disease was a long and frustrating process taking ten years from the time when the gene 
was first located on chromosome 4 in 1983 by scientists working in the Massachusetts 
General Hospital [19]. As with BRCA, various patents relating to testing for 
Huntington’s disease [20] and the Huntington’s disease gene [21] were filed in the US 
and other jurisdictions.  
 
2.4 Recombinant DNA technology 
Recombinant DNA technology is a classic example of a research tool. There are no 
alternatives to this technology and it is essential to all research in molecular biology [22]. 
The technology was developed by Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen at Stanford 
University and the University of California in the early 1970s. In an unusual step for the 
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time, patents were filed by Stanford and the University of California and granted in the 
1980s [23], [24]. 
 
2.5 Polymerase chain reaction and taq polymerase 
The polymerase chain reaction (PCR) enables specific and rapid amplification of existing 
DNA or RNA sequences in a test sample. Part of the process of PCR involves separating 
double stranded DNA using high temperatures. Taq polymerase is the enzyme used in the 
amplification, useful for its heat-resistant properties. Like recombinant DNA technology, 
it is a fundamental research tool in molecular biology. This technology was first 
developed by Kary Mullis at Cetus Corp. Various patents were filed and granted and 
subsequently assigned to F Hoffmann-La Roche AG [25], [26], [27]. 
 
2.6 Intron sequence analysis  
Genetic Technologies Ltd (GTG) is a small Australian biotechnology company that owns 
a number of patents relating to intron sequence analysis. These patents are extremely 
broad, encompassing much of the current technology that utilises non-coding regions in 
human and non-human genomes as molecular markers in both the research and clinical 
contexts. Essentially, they claim a method of using non-coding regions of DNA to predict 
mutations in active coding regions. GTG has been successful in obtaining patents in the 
US and other countries [28], [29], [30].  
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3. Legality of patents in the molecular diagnostic landscape 
 
3.1 Application of the patent and disclosure criteria  
Although many gene and related patents have been granted and many more await 
examination, their legality remains contentious. Traditionally, discoveries and products 
of nature have not been considered to fulfil the subject matter requirement because the 
essence of an invention is that knowledge and ingenuity are used to produce something 
new and useful. Although it is still widely accepted by patent offices and courts that 
products of nature as such are not patentable, isolation and purification of component 
parts of living organisms will take them outside the realm of this exclusion. Essentially, 
isolated genes and other nucleotide and polypeptide sequences are treated in law in the 
same way as other chemical compounds. Hence, they are patentable provided that they 
fulfil the technical patent requirements of novelty, inventive step, and industrial 
applicability [31].  
 
Whilst the isolation and characterisation of a gene outside of its natural environment 
might be sufficient to satisfy the novelty requirement, because prior to this the gene 
sequence was not publicly available, the situation with regard to fulfilment of the 
inventive step and industrial applicability requirements is more complex. The extent to 
which it is permissible for claims to extend beyond the boundaries of disclosure adds a 
further layer of complexity. There has been some judicial scrutiny and policy debate in 
relation to each of these criteria [31].  
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For inventive step, arguably, the techniques used to isolate and characterise genes are 
now so routine that little inventive ingenuity is required. However, in the US, the 
inventive step requirement has been interpreted liberally, focusing on the invention itself, 
not the techniques for producing it. This means that the question is whether the gene 
sequence is obvious, not whether the method used to obtain it was obvious to try. The 
US courts have accepted that the redundancy of the genetic code means that until the 
claimed molecules are actually isolated and purified it would have been highly unlikely 
that a person skilled in the area could have contemplated what was obtained [32], [33]. In 
Europe, in contrast, the focus is on whether the technique used to isolate the gene was 
‘obvious to try’ [7]. There have been calls for a similar stringent test to be adopted in the 
US, but at present the more lenient test continues to be determinative of the inventive 
step requirement [14]. 
 
Industrial applicability requires something more than mere disclosure of a gene sequence, 
because sequence information does not of itself provide much in the way of commercial 
utility. In the US, where industrial applicability is determined by the utility requirement, 
applicants must show specific, substantial and credible utility of the claimed invention 
[34]. This requirement may be met for gene patents if the protein-coding function of the 
sequence is disclosed. Gene fragments in the form of expressed sequence tags, with 
limited function as research probes, will rarely be patentable [35]. However, single 
nucleotide polymorphisms, which can be used to detect genetic variation across 
populations, are more likely to satisfy the utility requirement if they are used in forensic 
or pharmacogenetic testing [9]. 
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3.2 The European BRCA litigation 
The above analysis of patent requirements illustrates that there has been a willingness to 
interpret the patent criteria in such a way that they do not impose insuperable hurdles. An 
opportunity for judicial re-examination the legality of gene patents was provided in 
opposition proceedings relating to certain of the European BRCA1 patents: EP699754 
(claiming methods of diagnosis) [36], EP705903 (claiming various mutations of the 
BRCA1 gene) [37] and EP705902 (claiming the BRCA1 gene and protein and 
therapeutic applications) [38]. As a result of these proceedings EP688754 was struck 
down [39] and some of the claims in the other patents were declared invalid [40], [41]. 
The main problem with the patents was that the specified DNA sequences in the patents 
as granted were not precisely the same as those disclosed in the original applications and 
hence the original priority date could not be relied upon for determining novelty and 
inventive step. The broad claims were revoked by the Opposition Division and much 
narrower claims relating to hybridizable probes, cloning vectors and host cells were all 
that remained. Although these decisions provided beneficial outcomes for providers of 
BRCA1 testing services in Europe [42], they did little to clarify the law in this area since 
they primarily rested on technical issues arising during the process of prosecuting the 
patent applications.  
 
The EPO Board of Appeal (the Board) were given the opportunity to delve more broadly 
into the legality of gene patents in an appeal from the opposition to EP705902 in 
University of Utah Research Foundation/ Breast and Ovarian Cancer (the BRCA1 
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appeal) [3]. Appeals came from the University of Utah (assignee of the patent – appellant 
1) and one of the original opponents (Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz – appellant 
2). Appellant 1 requested that the decision revoking the main patent claims should be 
reconsidered. Appellant 2 sought to have the opposition proceedings upheld (allowing the 
patent in limited amended form) or the patent revoked. At the outset, the Board gave 
short shrift to appellant 1’s argument that it did not matter that the original sequence and 
the claimed sequence were not precisely the same. For the Board, the original and 
claimed sequences were not ‘the same invention’ [3 - para 29]. Appellant 1’s argument 
that the deviations did not affect function was not accepted.  
 
The Board then considered the claims allowed by the Opposition Division, concluding 
that, as they were derived from the original application, the early priority date could be 
relied on. The interesting part of the Board’s decision follows on from this. The Board 
examined whether the claims satisfied the subject matter requirement and concluded that 
because they relate to nucleic acid probes comprising partial DNA sequences of the 
human BRCA1 gene, they are isolated elements of the human body and hence are 
inventions not discoveries [3 - para 45].  
 
Appellant 2 argued that the claims should be excluded under Article 53(a) of the 
European Patent Convention (EPC) [43], which provides that: 
European patents shall not be granted in respect of: 
 (a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or 
morality …; 
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A number of grounds were raised in support of this argument. First, donation of human 
cells had been critical in identifying BRCA1 and donors had not given informed consent 
to commercial exploitation of the research results [3 - para 47]. Appellant 2 used recital 
26 of the European Biotechnology Directive [44] to support their argument. The purpose 
of this Directive is to provide assistance in interpreting the EPC for biotechnology 
patents. Recital 26 provides that when an invention is based on biological material of 
human origin the donor must have had the opportunity for expressing informed consent 
in accordance with national law. In the BRCA1 appeal, the Board noted that despite the 
presence of Recital 26, there is nothing in the EPC framework mandating verification of 
consent and that the absence of such provisions is not contrary to human rights 
obligations, such as the right to self-determination.  
 
The second ground raised by appellant 2 was that socio-economic consequences of 
exploiting the patent (including increased costs and influence on diagnostics and 
research) should be considered. The Board did not accept this argument either, 
emphasising that Article 53(a) relates to exploitation of the invention, not the patent. It 
was noted that the ordre public or morality consequences of the exploitation of the patent 
alleged by appellant 2 were the result of the exclusionary nature of the rights granted by a 
patent: ‘the right to stop competitors from using the invention’ and that such 
consequences would apply to the exploitation of any patent [3 - para 53].  
 
Finally in relation to Article 53(a) the Board noted that no arguments or evidence were 
led by appellant 2 as to whether exploitation of the invention itself would be contrary to 
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ordre public or morality [3 - pare 56]. Based on prior case law, it is most unlikely that 
such arguments would have been successful in any event. For example, in Howard 
Florey/Relaxin , concerning the molecular cloning and characterisation of a gene coding 
for human relaxin, the Opposition Division held that Article 53(a) should only be invoked 
in rare and extreme cases, to ensure that patents are not granted for inventions that would 
universally be regarded as outrageous [45]. The invention at issue in that matter was held 
not to be such a case. As a consequence of the Board’s decision in the BRCA1 appeal, 
the Opposition Division decision in Howard Florey/Relaxin and other European case law, 
it seems that there is little or no scope for using socio-economic or other ordre public or 
morality arguments to invalidate a gene or related patent.  
 
Appellant 2 in the BRCA1 appeal raised various other arguments based on industrial 
applicability, priority and inventive step. While it is not necessary to discuss these in 
detail, two relevant points warrant mention. First, the Board concluded that use of the 
claimed invention for diagnosis of cancer is sufficient to satisfy the industrial 
applicability requirement [3 - para 67]. Secondly, the Board added some clarification to 
the European interpretation of the inventive step requirement. Recalling that in Europe 
the inquiry is whether the steps undertaken by the inventor were obvious to try, the 
question is ‘whether a skilled person, having consulted the relevant prior art, would have 
readily undertaken the task performed by the inventor and would have had a reasonable 
expectation of success’. In discussing the requirement for a reasonable expectation of 
success, the Board stated that this requires more than a mere ‘hope to succeed’. What is 
required is ‘the ability to predict, based on the particular technical circumstance, a 
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successful conclusion to the project within acceptable time limits’ [3 - para 77]. This will 
be decided on a case-by-case basis. In the circumstances of this case, the claims accepted 
by the Opposition Division were held by the Board to satisfy the inventive step threshold.  
 
What is important from this and other relevant European decisions is that claims to 
nucleic acid probes (and, indeed, to full gene and polypeptide sequences) do not per se 
fail to satisfy the inventive step and industrial applicability grounds. Nor do they fail to 
satisfy the subject matter requirement. Given that the subject matter inquiry in Europe is 
more searching than in other jurisdictions and that the inventive step requirement tends to 
be more stringently applied, many more patents in the molecular diagnostic landscape are 
likely to be valid. Admittedly, the opponents to the BRCA1 patents in Europe succeeded 
in striking out key patent claims, but this was based on technical legal issues specific to 
that case. Other claims may also be struck out in future, but challenges are expensive and 
success is difficult to predict.  
 
3.3 The US LabCorp v Metabolite litigation 
The LabCorp v Metabolite litigation relates to US patent 4940658 [46], claim 13 of 
which is for assays for measuring levels of homocysteine in body fluids of warm-blooded 
animals and correlating elevated levels with deficiencies in the vitamins cobalamin and 
folate. Although this patent is not within the molecular diagnostics landscape as such, the 
outcomes of the litigation have been mooted as having significant implications for that 
landscape [47].  
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The focus of the litigation was on whether LabCorp, by encouraging doctors to order 
diagnostic tests for measuring homocysteine, induced them to infringe the patent. At trial 
[48] and on appeal [49], the courts held that the patent claim was valid and that LabCorp 
was liable for two reasons. First, any competent doctor who ordered tests for 
homocysteine levels would correlate test results with the presence or absence of a vitamin 
deficiency, and would thus be a direct infringer. Secondly, because LabCorp published 
articles that urged doctors to conduct the relevant tests and to make a determination on 
vitamin deficiency levels based upon the test results, this was enough for it to have 
induced infringement. The US Supreme Court initially agreed to hear a further appeal on 
these matters (through a so-called writ of certiorari) [4], but subsequently the majority of 
the court dismissed the action on the basis that it was improvidently decided, without 
delving further into the legality of claim 13 [50].  
 
In a strong dissenting judgment, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice 
Souter pointed to the fact that the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin 
deficiency was a natural phenomenon. It is well established in patent law that to be valid, 
claims to natural phenomena must include some sort of practical application. Metabolite 
argued that claim 13 gave the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency 
practical application because it claimed a ‘process’ for detecting vitamin deficiency, with 
discrete testing and correlating steps. This argument did not convince the minority of the 
Court, who saw the process as ‘no more than an instruction to read some numbers in light 
of medical knowledge’. On this basis claim 13 should have been declared invalid and not 
infringed.  
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It has been argued that genetic testing involves the same sort of correlation exercise 
between a patient’s DNA sequence and a reference sequence [47]. It has also been 
suggested that, based on the minority judgment of the US Supreme Court and comments 
made by another of the Supreme Court justices when the case was being heard, the Court 
as a whole may well have found that claim 13 was invalid if it had been given the 
opportunity to do so [47]. As a consequence, this case has re-ignited the debate about the 
patentability of claims relating to genetic testing. 
 
We might debate at length the rights and wrongs of legislation that is silent on the issue 
of patenting of genes and judicial decisions that interpret the legislation in such a way as 
to allow such patents. Indeed, much ink has been spilled on this issue. But the facts are 
that such patents have been issued and sanctioned by the courts. Legislation could be 
amended now to halt the surge of new gene patents, if that is deemed an appropriate 
policy direction, but the molecular diagnostic landscape is already cluttered with patents 
and the legal landscape is cluttered with precedents upholding their legality. The US 
Supreme Court may one day be given the opportunity to pronounce on these issues, but 
this may take some years. The real question that needs to be asked now is whether there 
is a way through this clutter to avoid the types of deleterious socio-economic 
consequences mooted by the opponents to the BRCA1 patents. 
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4. Evidence of the impact of patents in the molecular diagnostic landscape 
 
4.1 Impact of patents on clinical diagnostic services and molecular diagnostic 
research 
We have seen that gene and related patents are abundant and that to date courts and 
patent offices have not found that there is anything inherently unpatentable about them. 
Depending on how these patents are used, deleterious socio-economic consequences 
could result. Although the justification for patents is that they promote innovation, there 
is growing concern that gene and related patents may be used in ways that could have a 
significant negative impact on molecular diagnostics in both the clinical and research 
contexts [51]. 
 
Subject to any limitations imposed by law, the grant of gene and related patents entitles 
patent holders to enforce their patents against others, and to chose whether or not to 
license others to use those patents, to determine the conditions of use, and even, if they so 
chose, to ignore infringing actions. Where patented products are bought off the shelf, the 
product price includes a component for recovery of research costs. In such circumstances, 
patent costs are just one component of budget for doing research or testing.  
 
Whilst some laboratories may choose to purchase commercial products, if they are easy 
and cheaper to make in-house this may be the preferred option. In such circumstances, 
the patent holder may demand that the laboratory enters into a licensing agreement. The 
problem with this is that licences give much greater scope for collecting fees and 
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imposing other restrictions beyond the simple allocation of royalties out of the profits 
from product sales. Upfront, annual and milestone fees may be charged, as well as a 
percentage of royalties on downstream product sales. Limits might be place on the 
quantum of in-house use of the patented technology, or it might be prohibited entirely. In 
the research context, fees are also likely to be the major hurdle, but additional restrictions 
may also be imposed on publication, collaborations, sharing of materials and future 
commercialisation. 
 
For gene and related patents, it will often be the case that there are no products as such 
against which royalties can be collected and hence enforcement is by way of 
individually-negotiated or standard term licences. As an example, Myriad has been 
actively enforcing its patent rights against laboratories offering BRCA tests in a number 
of countries, requiring that samples are sent to Myriad’s own laboratories in Utah for 
testing [52]. In contrast, patent rights associated with the Huntington’s disease gene have 
not been asserted and licences have not been issued for financial gain [14]. 
 
As a general rule patented research tools tend to be non-exclusively licensed [53], often 
for small fees. This is not meant to suggest that all research tools are licensed in this way. 
Examples of more restrictive licensing practices have been noted in the literature for a 
number of years [22], [54], [55]. Yet non-exclusive licensing of research tools can be 
highly beneficial financially for the patent holder, at the same time causing minimal 
imposts for licensees. This strategy was remarkably lucrative for the owners of the 
recombinant DNA patents, with returns of US$139 million by 1995 [22]. PCR has also 
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been non-exclusively licensed and while it would appear that licence terms are not 
particularly onerous, there has been more criticism of the cost of taq polymerase.  
 
GTG has also successfully negotiated non-exclusive licensing arrangements with 
universities, commercial entities and providers of molecular diagnostic services in 
various jurisdictions, allowing use of its patented intron sequence analysis research tool 
[56]. While non-commercial organisations are offered research licences for nominal, one-
off fees, commercial licensees pay significant fees for past infringement and future use. 
For example, in 2003 Myriad itself agreed to pay an upfront fee of US$1 million for a 
non-exclusive licence to GTG’s patents, as well as annual licence fees and other non-
monetary consideration. Since then, GTG has continued to actively pursue its licensing 
strategy, reporting that in 2007 alone it earned $11.3 million in license fees [57]. In the 
clinical context, GTG settled a dispute with the Auckland District Health Board in New 
Zealand relating to alleged infringement of its patents in diagnostic testing on undisclosed 
terms [58]. Despite fears that other public diagnostic service providers might be targeted 
[56], no other relevant licensing agreements have been disclosed on GTG’s website to 
date [58]. What this account of GTG’s actions suggests is that just because a patent is 
non-exclusively licensed, it doesn’t necessarily follow that the impact on potential 
licensees is insignificant in monetary terms. 
 
Both of the Myriad and GTG scenarios are often presented as evidence of the potential 
for gene and related patents to have detrimental socio-economic consequences [59]. 
There is some evidence of more widespread enforcement of gene patents in clinical 
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molecular diagnostic testing in the US. Research published in 2003 reports that a number 
of gene patent and licence holders were actively enforcing their patents against providers 
of genetic tests by refusing to license or imposing restrictive terms in licences [51], [60]. 
These actions reportedly led to a number of test providers ceasing to perform genetic tests 
they had previously offered and to a number of others deciding not to develop or perform 
a test because of the patent considerations. In total, 22 patents were identified as being 
actively enforced, affecting 12 genetic tests, some of which related to common genetic 
disorders, including haemchromatosis, Fragile X syndrome, Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy and Huntington’s disease. Others related to more complex disorders such as 
Alzheimer’s disease and hereditary breast and ovarian cancer.  
 
In contrast, a similar published study by the author in Australia [61] found little evidence 
of enforcement of patents against public testing laboratories and the results of yet to be 
published studies in New Zealand [62] [personal communication Aphra Green] and the 
UK [personal communication Naomi Hawkins] appear to be closely aligned with those in 
Australia. There is also a dearth of commentary in the academic and popular media about 
specific patent enforcement actions in relation to clinical molecular diagnostic testing 
outside the US, save for the Myriad and GTG cases discussed above.  
 
In the research context, a number of strategies have been used to attempt to measure the 
impact of gene and related patents. For example, one research group used citations in 
peer-reviewed journals [63]. They identified research that had been both published and 
patented and measured the number of citations pre- and post-patent grant. They found 
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that citations do significantly decrease post grant, but only in a modest way. Whilst their 
results suggest that patents appear to create some restrictions on subsequent research, the 
impact is not excessively detrimental. Other empirical research involving questionnaires 
and interviews with public sector researchers suggests that in their view gene and related 
patents rarely impede research programs [61], [64]. 
 
4.2 The legal landscape  
The evidence presented above suggests that widespread enforcement of gene and related 
patents against molecular diagnostic testing laboratories and public research 
organizations has not emerged to date, aside from some isolated examples and some more 
worrying trends from the US clinical molecular diagnostic sector. However, concern 
continues to be expressed within these sectors about the impact of patents on research and 
on the provision of tests to end-users [65], [66], [67]. Law reform agencies in various 
jurisdictions have scrutinised this area on some detail, and have come to common 
conclusions as to the way forward [68], [69], [70]. It is widely accepted that research 
relating to patented inventions should be exempt from patent infringement actions, but 
only to the extent that it involves testing the validity of the claimed invention, or 
understanding how the invention works, or exploring how to make improvements to the 
invention. One difficulty in this area is that the law is uncertain because in some 
jurisdictions patent legislation includes express experimental use provisions (eg, the UK), 
in others there is a limited common law exclusion (eg, the US) and in others still the 
legislation is silent and there is no case law directly on point (eg, Australia) [71]. A 
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further difficulty is that exemptions of this nature do not protect use of patented research 
tools, even when that use is for research purposes [14], [68].  
 
Patent legislation often includes other provisions allowing use of the patented invention 
without the permission of the patent owner, which may be triggered when the patent 
holder fails to provide sufficient pubic benefit from the patent grant. For example, a 
compulsory licence is a court or administrative order requiring the patent holder to allow 
others to work the invention. Government use is use of the invention by the government 
for the purposes of the state without having to obtain permission from the patent owner. 
In Australia, the Australian Law Reform Commission has suggested that the provision of 
public health services, including diagnostic testing, could fall within the concept of 
government use [69]. The circumstances in which compulsory licences and government 
use are allowed vary from country to country [69].  
 
To date, the appropriate circumstances have not arisen for testing the capacity of the 
research exemption or the compulsory licensing or government use provisions to 
circumvent adverse socio-economic consequences of patent enforcement in the molecular 
diagnostic landscape. Such circumstances may arise in the future, but for now it would 
seem that public sector researchers and clinicians may not need to be overly concerned 
that they will be faced with a flood of patent enforcement demands, despite the 
complexity of the patent landscape. In effect, it seems that many patent holders might 
well be content to allow public footpaths to traverse their property in the molecular 
diagnostic landscape. This not to say that public organizations are entirely freed from the 
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fetters of patent enforcement. The risk remains that from time to time individual patent 
holders might decide to aggressively pursue their patent rights against such organizations. 
Strategic decisions have to be made about how to respond at those times.  
 
On the other hand, commercial entities cannot afford such complacency. One of the 
reasons why there is more evidence of patent enforcement against clinical molecular 
diagnostic laboratories in the US than elsewhere might well be because that jurisdiction 
tends to have a higher ratio of private to public laboratories [51], [56] (recognising that 
patent holders might also be strategically targeting testing facilities in that jurisdiction 
because of the higher volume of testing than elsewhere, and hence the greater opportunity 
for remuneration). Assessment of the impact of patents in the molecular diagnostic 
landscape requires scrutiny of the changing nature of the landscape, particularly focusing 
on the increasing commercialisation of this sector. 
 
4.3 Impact of patents on the molecular diagnostic industry 
The private sector has, for many years, been involved in the manufacture and sale of 
commercial test kits and other reagents that laboratories require for research and clinical 
diagnostic purposes. More recently, however, genetic testing itself has been developing 
into a potentially lucrative industry. Many companies specialise in providing genetic 
testing for specific disease traits, either directly to consumers or acting as intermediaries 
between consumers and testing facilities [72]. Others specialise in offering tests for the 
range of SNPs used to predict predisposition to cardiovascular disease, response to drug 
treatments and a whole range of other conditions that impact on lifestyle. The availability 
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of such tests raises a host of scientific, legal, ethical and social concerns, ranging from the 
accuracy and validity of test results to the need for appropriate genetic counselling, the 
requirements for fully informed consent and the protection of privacy and confidentiality 
[73]. These considerations, together with difficulties in obtaining reimbursement for 
diagnostic testing and low profit margins tend to make this industry sector unattractive to 
investors [74].  
 
The complexity of the molecular diagnostic patent landscape doubtless creates further 
investment disincentives [74]. Yet despite these uncertainties about the value and 
viability of the industry, it is recognised as offering important future benefits in terms of 
efficient and effective healthcare delivery [75]. For this reason alone, it is important to 
ensure that adverse socio-economic consequences of patenting of gene and related 
inventions are avoided to the greatest extent possible. But at the same time, the 
overarching purpose of the patent system should not be forgotten. Patents promote 
innovation by encouraging patent holders to commercially develop their inventions and 
to invest in further inventive activity. If too many limitations are imposed on these 
incentives then different kinds of adverse socio-economic consequences could result. In 
many countries, governments have fostered the development of indigenous biomedical 
industries at the interface between research and clinical practice through grants and other 
incentives [14], [69]. As patents are the only products for many of these industry 
participants [76], their survival and their ongoing involvement in research and 
development depends on their ability to maintain and license out those patents. The 
balance is a delicate one. 
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The work of John Walsh and his colleagues in the US [55] suggests the biomedical 
industry as a whole is finding ways of working around perceived problems associated 
with gene and related patents, particularly the risks that broad patents and patent thickets 
will deter downstream innovation [77], [78]. Research in Australia and Europe supports 
the Walsh findings, consistently reporting that industry players are able to license out 
their own technology and license in the technology they need to secure freedom to 
operate [61], [79] [80], [81]. It seems that, for the most part, research tool patent holders 
license widely, and users engage in a number of strategies to ensure that their research 
and development programs can continue, including licensing-in, inventing around, 
litigating to challenge patent validity, moving offshore, or simply ignoring the patents 
that would otherwise block their research.  
 
Despite this optimistic picture, molecular diagnostic companies do have to navigate 
through the increasingly complex patent landscape, and the associated challenges should 
not be trivialised. Companies involved in the development of microarray technology, 
which allows for multiple tests to be undertaken, are likely to face the greatest level of 
complexity. If such companies wish to ensure freedom to operate, they have to undertake 
onerous search obligations to ascertain which patents contain relevant claims and then 
enter into multiple licensing negotiations. The risks of royalty stacking and hold up by 
intransigent patent holders in such an environment are particularly high. It is not 
surprising that leaders in the field like Affymetrix rail against gene and related patents 
[82].  
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5. Conclusion 
 
We have seen that the molecular diagnostic patent landscape is indeed highly complex, 
both in terms of numbers and types of patents, and it is safe to assume that if all such 
patents were enforced against researchers and clinicians there would be adverse socio-
economic consequences. However, it would be premature to end our discussion of the 
challenges in navigating the molecular diagnostic patent landscape at this point.  
 
Realistically, it is not in the interest of any one patent holder to create a situation leading 
to industry collapse. For this reason alone, it is sensible for patent holders to take a 
pragmatic approach with regard to use of their patented inventions by non-commercial 
entities. Both research use and clinical use are more likely to enhance rather than stultify 
the development of the industry. Hence, currently it is not the norm for researchers and 
clinicians operating in the public sector to be exposed to aggressive patent enforcement 
actions, nor is such a norm likely to emerge in the near future (recognising that isolated 
instances of such enforcement actions probably will continue to occur). But a different 
response might be expected where users are primarily profit-driven. In such 
circumstances, patent holders are far less likely to be willing to forego patent licensing 
revenue.  
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6. Expert opinion 
 
Companies operating in the molecular diagnostic patent landscape are likely to face many 
challenges in the years ahead, including wasted expenditure associated with patent 
searches and licensing negotiations, together with potential risks associated with hold out 
by holders of foundational patents, insistence on restrictive licensing terms and royalty 
stacking resulting from patent thickets. The lack of clear legal solutions to the challenges 
associated with enforcement and use of gene and related patents is encouraging academic 
commentators, policy makers and the industry itself to explore other solutions. Top-down 
support has been expressed by leading national and international agencies for non-
exclusive licensing of gene and related patents [69], [70], [83], [84], [85]. But this does 
not necessarily assist patent holders in the challenging task of identifying users of their 
technology to license out to. Nor does it assist users in identifying relevant patents and 
negotiating arrangements for licensing-in to ensure that they have freedom to operate. 
 
It should be recognised that, at the very least, mechanisms need to be put in place to 
streamline licensing negotiations and agreements for the benefit of patent holders and 
users. For example, standard term, non-exclusive licences may often be adequate for 
licensing gene and research tool patents in molecular diagnostics. The molecular 
diagnostic industry may also benefit from the establishment of some type of collective 
rights arrangement. Patent pooling is one strategy that should be considered. A patent 
pool is an agreement between two or more patent holders to aggregate or pool their 
patents, particularly those deemed ‘essential’ to a given product. Since the 1850s, patent 
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pools have played a significant role internationally in bringing a range of products to the 
marketplace [86].  
 
These types of private arrangements could ameliorate some of the problems arising from 
the proliferation of gene and related patents in the molecular diagnostic sector [87], [88], 
[89], although some doubt has been expressed as to whether there is sufficient incentive 
for patent holders to willingly enter into voluntary arrangements of this nature [79]. 
Nevertheless, patent pool-type arrangements are emerging in some biotechnology sectors, 
including a pool to collectively manage the patents relating to golden rice for diffusion to 
developing countries (golden rice has been genetically engineered to produce a precursor 
to vitamin A)  [90], and proposed pools in relation to medicines for HIV/AIDS, pandemic 
influenza, malaria and the SARS virus [91]. These examples suggest that patent pools 
offer some promise in addressing the socio-economic costs associated with patenting and 
licensing in biotechnology. Some scepticism has been expressed about the usefulness of 
such pools in the present regulatory framework and industrial context of biotechnology, 
but there is more optimism about their potential role in the future [92]. 
 
The use of clearinghouse mechanisms should also be explored as a means of reducing the 
transaction costs in licensing gene and related patents in the molecular diagnostic sector. 
A clearinghouse might perform one or more of the following functions: facilitating the 
search for technology that is available for licensing or for free; smoothing the progress of 
negotiations; and monitoring or enforcing negotiated agreements [93]. Like patent pools, 
clearinghouses are already being established in some biotechnology sectors. For example, 
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the Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA) facilitates sharing of 
access to agricultural technologies by US-based public-sector agricultural research 
institutions. There has also been a proposal for the establishment of a royalty collection 
clearinghouse in diagnostics, modelled somewhat on the copyright collecting societies 
[94].  
 
Other mechanisms like open source licensing also warrant some consideration [95]. 
There is unlikely to be one ‘right’ way forward for the molecular diagnostic sector, and 
these options should not be seen as mutually exclusive [96]. However, preliminary results 
from a survey currently being undertaken by the author in Australia and colleagues in 
Europe indicate that there is still a perception among many industry participants that 
there is no urgent need to explore these options. This research indicates that significant 
hurdles will need to be overcome before the majority of industry participants will 
willingly enter into such arrangements. These include complexity, expense, loss of 
exclusivity and inability to engage with all relevant parties. It is argued that at this stage 
of the development of the molecular diagnostic industry sector it is timely to explore and 
experiment with these industry-driven mechanisms. It may be that renewed uncertainty as 
to the legality of gene patents resulting from the actions of the US Supreme Court in the 
LabCorp v Metabolite litigation will encourage industry participants to take a more 
cooperative approach. But in addition to this, policymakers also need to play a more 
active role in advising the industry about how these mechanisms might operate, and 
assisting with their design, set up and implementation, and, if necessary, providing 
incentives for their uptake, for the socio-economic benefit of society as a whole. This 
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should be part of a broader policy discussion on patenting and licensing in molecular 
diagnostics, which should include all relevant players, as recently recommended by the 
European Society of Human Genetics [97]. 
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